Standing Committee A

[Mr. Alan Hurst in the Chair]

Crime (International Co-operation) Bill [Lords]

Amendment proposed [this day]: No. 135, in 
clause 20, page 12, line 29, at end insert— 
 '( ) manifestly correspond with the freezing order'.
 Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

David Heath: That needs to be addressed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21 - Considering the order

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 37, in
clause 21, page 12, line 41, leave out 'a court' and insert 'the High Court'.
 The amendment deals with a matter that was discussed in another place on 23 January. An amendment was moved by my noble Friend Baroness Anelay of St. Johns and supported by the distinguished and experienced lawyer, the noble Lord Renton, a former Home Office Minister. Lord Renton said: 
''I should have thought that the Secretary of State, instead of merely referring the matter to some relatively minor local court—which he could do under the Bill as drafted—should refer it to the High Court.''
 The Attorney-General, resisted our amendment, and said: 
''The Government could not accept the amendment that imposed the obligation to limit execution of these orders simply on the High Court . . . Requests for evidence from overseas are currently generally dealt with by a magistrates' court. The Secretary of State has the power to put it to someone else, but there seems no reason why that procedure should not be followed for evidence freezing orders under the new procedure.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 23 January 2003; Vol. 643, c. GC 86–87.]
 In the other place, we were seeking clarity; I want to go a little further. These are important matters. I have enormous respect for the lay magistracy, and we on the Conservative Benches have tried to defend it from the assaults and depredations of the Government. I do not blame the Minister for what has happened, because it is the Lord Chancellor's Department that has boxed in magistrates courts committees so tightly that they have been forced to close magistrates courts even when they did not want to, as they had to follow what are, in my view, completely misguided Government diktats on what magistrates courts had to have. Since the Government came to power, more than 100 magistrates courts have closed. 
 Power is being taken away from the lay magistracy, and we are getting away from the concept of local justice. As there are fewer magistrates courts, when important international matters come up, they should be required to go to the High Court. I have read what the Attorney-General said on the subject in another place, but I wanted to hear a little more from the Minister, and I wanted to place our continuing concerns on the record.

Bob Ainsworth: Freezing orders will be executed by issuing a domestic search warrant or production order, and will be dealt with by the same courts that handle mutual legal assistance requests to seize evidence. The magistrates court is nominated to issue search warrants—unless the material requested is excluded or is special procedural material, in which case the Crown court is nominated to issue a production order. The terms ''special procedural material'' and ''excluded material'' have the same meanings as they do in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
 We intend to continue with the current practice when nominating a court under the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, of nominating a court that is local to where the evidence is thought to be. Full training will be provided for magistrates, clerks of magistrates courts, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Crown court, Customs and the police. I do not think that it is appropriate that the use of the freezing orders and the ability to deal with them should be restricted to the High Court. It would be inappropriate and costly to use a court that was not local to the incident. Similar powers have been exercised under the old legislation, which was passed by previous Governments since 1990.

Nick Hawkins: I hear what the Minister has to say. Of course, we do not want to make matters more costly, but I am sure that the Minister understands our worries, in that some complex issues would be more appropriately dealt with in the High Court. We may need to return to such matters, but the Minister has placed the Government's view on the record and I shall not pursue the matter. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clauses 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 22 to 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25 - Release of evidence held under the order

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 136, in
clause 25, page 14, line 27, leave out 'may' and insert 'must'.
 The clause is a puzzlement to me. I hope that the Minister will be able to help me. It deals with the release of evidence that has been held under the order. Subsection (1) states that 
''the nominated court may authorise the release of any evidence retained by a constable under section 24 if, in its opinion—
the condition in section 21(6) or (7) is met, or
the overseas freezing order has ceased to have effect in the participating country.''
 I refer the Committee back to the condition under clause 21(6) or (7), which concern the circumstances in which the person who is the subject of the freezing order would be entitled to be discharged under any rule of law relating to previous acquittal or conviction. In other words, that person cannot be convicted of the offence to which the investigation and the evidence relates. 
 The second condition described under subsection (7) refers to 
''giving effect to the overseas freezing order would be incompatible with any of the Convention rights (within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998''.
 Surely to goodness if either of those conditions apply, there should not be a discretion about whether the court releases evidence that is properly the property of the person in question. It must release it. 
 The second condition under 25(1)(b) is if 
''the overseas freezing order has ceased to have effect in the participating country.''
 Again, there is no case to answer. Therefore, what are the circumstances in which a court may hold that it is lawful for a constable to retain evidence on the basis of an order, which was shown either to have been extinguished, which was improper because it related to an offence to which the supposed defendant was entitled to be acquitted, or was a breach of convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998? There is no potential doubt about the matter. The court must release the property. Not to release the property would be a contravention of the Human Rights Act, in that that person is entitled to peaceful enjoyment of his property. 
 Unless I have grievously misread the clause, the Minister must accept this amendment or give a very good reason why it will not be accepted, because I fail to understand in what circumstances the court would retain—or cause the constable to retain—such evidence without challenging the law, which would be improper.

Nick Hawkins: Once again, it is a pleasure to support the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath). I am sure that the Minister will accuse us of having a new Lib-Con pact, as he did before lunch. However, on a serious point, the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome is right: I cannot envisage any situation in which this information could possibly not be handed over, and the clause would be much better if ''may'' was replaced by ''must''. I am hopeful that on this occasion the Minister will surprise us all by saying that he accepts the amendment and supports what the Liberal Democrats are trying to do.

Bob Ainsworth: Mr. Hurst, you were not in the Chair this morning, so I have to say to you that I never started this. It was Lib-Labbery to start off with, and I only ever did what I often do, which was to retaliate a bit. I was provoked.
 The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome makes his case very well, but I cannot at the moment give the 
 Committee what he asks for, which is an instance when the court might not authorise such a release. Where the European convention on human rights was being infringed, that would be apparent to the court, and it would comply, and release the information. The issue is whether we compel the court to do that or rely on it to do so. 
 If we cannot think of any reason why there should be some discretion in this area, we will give some consideration to the amendment. If the hon. Gentleman withdraws the amendment, we will reflect on it and return to it on Report, with a view to justifying the discretion in the Bill or to considering a similar amendment.

David Heath: I am grateful to the Minister for that. As a parting shot, I draw his attention to the fact that ''must'' is used in line 41 of page 14. Therefore, the idea of a discussion being available at all levels is not true.

Bob Ainsworth: The hon. Gentleman should not seek to capitalise on his position. The word ''may'' is used in many places in the Bill.

David Heath: Yes, but this use of ''must'' is in the same clause as that which the amendment addresses, and it has the same intention of providing for the release of evidence held under an order that is no longer valid. I was seeking to help the Minister's consideration of this matter, rather than score additional points.
 On the basis of the assurance that he has just given, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27 - Exercise of powers by others

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 40, in
clause 27, page 15, line 35, leave out 'Treasury' and insert 'Secretary of State'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 41, in 
clause 27, page 15, line 43, at end insert 
 'and guidance issued by the Secretary of State'.
 Amendment No. 42, in 
clause 27, page 16, line 1, leave out subsection (2).

James Paice: We now come to another group of slightly disparate amendments. Amendment No. 40 is straightforward and simple. There may be a clear reason for the phraseology of the clause, but it seems odd that, under its heading,
''Exercise of powers by others'',
 reference is made to ''The Treasury''. Such measures are almost unique because, invariably, Bills refer to the Secretary of State. 
 This morning, the Minister said, ''The Secretary of State does not necessarily mean the Home Secretary.'' He wanted to put it on the record that the ''Secretary of State'' covers each member of the Government. Thus, ''The Treasury'' seems somewhat out of kilter with normal practice.

David Heath: As always.

James Paice: The hon. Gentleman suggested that the Treasury is normally out of kilter with everything anyway. He is probably right.
 Usually, Bills refer to the Secretary of State, which is a term that covers all Ministers, including those acting under the Secretary of State. I therefore do not understand why the Treasury is referred to in the clause. It may be many other things, but the Treasury is not a person. It is an institution. The Bill states that it may ''by order provide'' for functions to be transferred. That is odd. If the person involved must be someone from the Treasury, surely reference should be made to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as its head, or even the First Lord of the Treasury, the Prime Minister. I accept that it is a minor point, but the reference to the Treasury struck me as odd. It jars with the usual way in which Bills are drafted. 
 Amendment No. 41 relates to circumstances under which the commissioners can prescribe the functions to be conferred on the Secretary of State. We consider that guidance should be issued by the Secretary of State. The amendment would require that when the Treasury has conferred on a Customs officer the same functions as those exercised by a constable, the Customs officer should still follow guidance issued by the Secretary of State so that it follows the same pattern as the one whereby functions would be operated by a constable who issues guidance to officers, albeit rarely. Much of what the Bill deals with will not happen often; it may happen even less often for a Customs officer. Therefore, it would be a significant step forward to issue guidance to ensure that we have consistency in implementation and activity. 
 Amendment No. 42 would omit subsection (2), which concerns the power being given to the Secretary of State to delegate by order his responsibility to another person. The subsection refers to functions being conferred 
''in prescribed circumstances by a prescribed person'';
 in other words, it refers to whoever the Secretary of State decides to put into the order. The measure is a Henry VIII clause. However, it goes beyond that because we need to know who the Secretary of State is likely to want to prescribe by order. It is not impossible to imagine a situation in which the Secretary of State might want an individual to do something and that individual was neither a constable nor a Customs officer. However, an individual cannot be prescribed in an order. If we are to have more than one order, clearly the Secretary of State is envisaging categories of people or employees of organisations who would receive such functions. It would be helpful if the Minister told us who he imagined that would be. One possibility is CSOs—community support officers—and there are countless others, such as the 
 Crown Prosecution Service and the Serious Fraud Office, on which powers might be conferred. If the Minister can tell us which organisations will be included, I would have preferred to see those in the Bill. It seems odd that we are giving the Secretary of State a wide-ranging power to provide by order powers to any person or group. If he knows who that will be, why cannot it be included in the Bill? It could be added, even if we wanted to keep the open power in case things change. If the Government cannot tell us who these people are, I am not convinced that we need the order-making power at all. 
 The amendment is exploratory, but important because the clause gives a significant power to the Secretary of State. We need to know the Government's real intentions. I understand that the CPS and the SFO do not want the powers. If that is the case, the Bill should not include a power for the Secretary of State to give powers to those bodies. I look forward to the Minister's comments on the three amendments, which all address slightly different issues. I hope that he can reassure me on some of them, and that he will be generous enough to recognise the point behind the amendment relating to the Treasury.

David Heath: I hope that it will not inconvenience the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire (Mr. Paice) too much if I agree with him on all three amendments.
 The Treasury appears to have a semi-mythic status in Government. As I understand it, the Treasury must be treated with the greatest of respect, certainly if a Department wants anything from the next comprehensive spending review. However, there does not seem to be any reason for it to be singled out in legislation, but perhaps the Home Office has to render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's. I shall not be distraught if the amendment is unsuccessful, but I think that we are seeing yet another oddity in the way in which we make law in this country. 
 The point about guidance is more substantive. I have argued many times in statutory instrument Committees, particularly those relating to PACE and the guidance notes that are given to police in the execution of their duties, that almost invariably parallel functions are exercised by other non-police enforcement officers, especially those who work for Her Majesty's Customs and Excise. It seems sensible to ensure that the guidance that is issued to Customs and Excise is the same as that issued to police officers in the exercise of their duties when they are doing the same thing. There is an invisible, or even visible, wall between the Home Office and the Treasury, which prevents full co-operation—not operationally, but structurally. It would be much better if both Departments considered matters initially and they came to a common view. They could then produce common advice to those who need to operate legislative functions on the ground. 
 We have already had an argument about the power to make secondary legislation. My view is that if powers are conferred on organisations or individuals they should, where possible, be named in primary legislation; they should not be reserved for secondary legislation. I support the hon. Gentleman.

Bob Ainsworth: First, on amendment No. 40, I tell the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire that at the top of my page is the word, ''Resist''—not that that means anything; the previous one said the same thing.
 The Government considers that the power to make orders conferring powers on Customs is properly exercised by the Treasury, because it is responsible for Customs and Excise so it holds the power to make orders on its behalf. Similar powers were given to the Treasury in section 7(7) of the Criminal Justice (International Co-Operation) Act 1990. That is the extent of my argument. I have inquired who provided me with that argument—would hon. Members believe that it was the Treasury? 
 I am not certain to what degree I am prepared to resist. I remember that once upon a time I was a Treasury Whip and on one occasion, when I asked why the Finance Bill was not due to meet in the mornings, I was told that it was because it was the Finance Bill Committee. That has changed, but we seem to have a similar defence in this case. In light of the points that have been made in the Committee, I assure hon. Members that I shall seek further advice from the Treasury about whether it would want us to continue to resist the amendment. 
 Amendment No. 41 has a bit more substance to it. I accept the point that was made earlier. Let us consider it and see whether it makes sense. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to issue guidance describing the circumstances in which a Customs officer might exercise powers. 
 The ability to confer powers on Customs is a key provision. The key effect of conferring powers would be to enable direct transmission of requests to Customs and Excise, without granting it certain powers that are currently only available to the Secretary of State, such as the ability to nominate courts. It is pointless to allow direct transmission to Customs, because it would still have to return requests to the central authority to obtain a court nomination or a search warrant. The UK is under an obligation to move towards direct transmission of requests. The clause represents a practical way to achieve that with Customs. 
 Customs and Excise is experienced in handling mutual legal assistance requests. It has indicated that it would like to be able to receive and execute requests directly. It already receives requests directly, but it must revert to the Secretary of State if a court nomination or a search warrant application is required. That bureaucratic process could be fulfilled entirely properly by Customs.

James Paice: The Minister has admitted that the first brief was garbage and, if he reflects, he will see that his current brief is garbage, too. No one is contesting whether Customs officers should have the power. We debated that on Tuesday. We are now talking about whether it should operate under the guidance of the Secretary of State.

Bob Ainsworth: Much of the Bill is about how we devolve some of the powers from the centre and
 whether guidance from the Secretary of State is necessary to do that.
 Let me continue for a minute to see whether I can satisfy the hon. Gentleman. There are many cases in which Customs investigators take the lead and where it would be entirely appropriate for them to have the same powers to seek assistance as the police—for instance, Customs and Excise takes the lead in many international drug trafficking cases. 
 There is no need for further guidance. The conditions will be described by order, and they will be binding. It will be open to the Secretary of State to issue guidance on this point, if that seems appropriate, but it is unnecessary to refer to that in the legislation. There will, of course, be extensive guidance covering all the Bill's new provisions. I do not know whether that satisfies the hon. Gentleman. 
 Amendment No. 42 would also restrict a key enabling provision, which is intended to allow other authorities to take on executing powers in the same way as is provided for Customs. Including this power gives the Government flexibility to allow for greater use of direct transmission, should that be desirable in future. We have no immediate plans to confer powers on other authorities, but a general review of our mutual legal assistance system is in progress. 
 The hon. Gentleman asked what other organisations we are envisaging as well as Customs. He mentioned some of them: the Serious Fraud Office, the police and the Crown Prosecution Service do not currently have the appropriate remit, but that is being looked at. As I have said, we are under an obligation to consider decentralisation in these matters. These are the sorts of organisation that will be doing this, but I cannot be specific by naming them in the Bill at this stage. Our reason for seeking the order-making powers is to enable us to act appropriately at the time. We are not talking about community support officers or other named individuals—potentially, it is the organisations, but that must be considered in the review of our mutual legal assistance provisions. 
 The power was considered by the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which appeared to accept our explanation—that we needed to provide flexibility for the future. It found that the power was appropriately delegated. As the hon. Gentleman knows, all such delegated powers are examined, and this one was recommended for approval. 
 In light of what I have said about guidance—that it will probably be needed but that it is unnecessary to include it in the Bill—and the appropriateness of the delegated powers, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw amendments Nos. 41 and 42. I assure him that I will make the Hansard report of the Committee's proceedings available not to any individual but to the Treasury with regard to amendment No. 40, so that we may hear what it has to say.

James Paice: Not only with this Bill, but with other Bills over which the Minister and I have sparred, he has always shown considerable common sense, even in
 the face of contradictory briefs, and I am grateful to him for that on this occasion. Common sense is not a phenomenon that often crosses the portals of the Treasury, but I am appreciative that he realises the import of the fact that the Treasury is not a person: it is a building or institution, so the concept of it giving powers is odd.
 I am grateful to the Minister for his comments. I chided him when he was responding to amendment No. 41, because it seemed as though practically everything he said was about justifying giving the powers to Customs and Excise officials, and no one is contesting that. Indeed, on Tuesday, amendments from both the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives sought to insert ''Customs and Excise'' into the Bill, so it can hardly be considered controversial for it to have the powers. 
 My much narrower point was that when Customs and Excise is operating these powers, it should do so under the guidance of the Secretary of State for the purposes of consistency. The last paragraph of the Minister's brief addressed that point, and I am grateful for his comments and reassurance. However, I still take the view that it would have been better to insert the phrase in the Bill, but fair enough. 
 On subsection (2) and the delegation of powers to others by order, it obviously sticks in my throat a little to accept that the Secretary of State should effectively have power to prescribe any organisation by order. Of course I accept what the Minister says—that a review is taking place, that there is no immediate hidden agenda, and that it is not as though as soon as the Bill receives Royal Assent the Government will come up with an order giving the powers to a range of other organisations. However, I still think that it is a shame that the Secretary of State should require the power to seek an order, and we will need to reflect on whether any such order should not at least be made by affirmative procedure, and whether the details of any power of significance should be considered by the House of Commons. 
 However, I am half-persuaded by the Minister's argument that we should not remove the subsection altogether. Particularly in light of the Minister's words about amendment No. 40, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 27 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29 - Hearing witnesses abroad through

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 43, in
clause 29, page 17, line 12, at end insert— 
 '(1A) An order under subsection (1) shall be made by statutory instrument and may not be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing the order has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.'.
 The amendment would insert new subsection (1A), which would require the affirmative procedure to be used. The Committee will be familiar with the belief of 
 those on the Opposition Benches that that is an important safeguard. 
 We strongly support the use of television and video links. Indeed, when I practised as a corporate lawyer, I had the happy experience of using the very first video link suite installed north of the border. I am particularly sorry that the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) is not on the Liberal Democrat Benches this afternoon, because it was a particularly enterprising firm of Writers to the Signet of Edinburgh that had installed one of the video suites. I used it for video conferencing, from the offices of the company south of the border to which I was group legal adviser, with the Scots lawyers that we were working with north of the border, on a matter that had not yet gone to court, but might subsequently have done so. 
 I therefore saw for myself, in the early days of video conferencing suites, how useful they could be in legal cases. I am pleased that they are now used much more extensively, particularly in cases in which witnesses are overseas or that involve child witnesses, and their use has grown in all parts of the legal profession. Nothing that I say about the clause is intended to deprecate the use of the new facilities; I think that they can be extremely useful, and it is good that a general expansion of their use is set out in the clause. However, I would prefer to have the affirmative resolution procedure in the clause.

David Heath: I concur.

Bob Ainsworth: The clause allows us to expand, by negative resolution, the types of proceedings in which the UK may request the sort of evidence mentioned in the clause from overseas. The amendment would require such orders to be made by affirmative resolution. We do not believe that that is necessary. The courts can already request such assistance from overseas in certain proceedings by virtue of section 32 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The types of proceedings covered include homicide, serious fraud cases and cases involving the evidence of children.
 The clause provides for those sections to apply to further types of proceedings. There are no immediate plans to make the power more widely available. We did not consider that the Bill was the appropriate vehicle to make such amendments, although we consider that clause 29 provides a practical solution, as it ensures that section 32 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 may be extended in future. 
 The general application of the clause is not restricted to participating countries. That reflects the existing position under the Criminal Justice Act. We consider that those arrangements have a particular benefit in respect of countries outside Europe, which pose greater obstacles in respect of travel for witnesses. That sort of assistance is a useful tool in trials to deal with offences that take place in more than one state, which are often those in which organised and criminal groups are involved. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report on the Bill considered that and made no comment on the power. Therefore, we understand that the Committee was 
 satisfied with the level of scrutiny given and that the negative procedure was appropriate.

Nick Hawkins: The Minister is introducing the novel concept that because another Committee of the House of Commons does not comment on something, it means that it agrees with it. A silence does not indicate consent or assent, and the Minister should be stern with the officials who wrote that brief because there are many occasions when a Committee does not comment on something. That does not necessarily mean that it agrees with it. If the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee had said that it was quite happy with matters, the Minister would be entitled to say that he sees no problem. However, just because it did not mention it at all does not mean that the Minister can assume that the Committee was happy with it.

Bob Ainsworth: In principle, I would accept what the hon. Gentleman is saying, if it were not for the fact that we are talking about the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, whose function is to consider proposals for delegated powers and decide whether they are set at a particular level. It took such action and said nothing about it. If it had thought that the negative procedure was inappropriate, it would be pretty strange that it said nothing about it.

Nick Hawkins: I hear what the Minister says, but I wanted to warn him that I do not think that he is wise to say that because a Committee says nothing about something, it necessarily connotes that it is happy with it. The hon. Gentleman knows what I am saying. He said that, in general terms, he agrees with me. He understands where we are coming from on the issue.
 We think that, if there is to be an order-making power as set out in clause 29(1) and that power is to be used, the House of Commons should scrutinise it. The Minister says that the Government do not have in mind any extension at the moment and they did not think that the Bill was the appropriate vehicle to use, but they wanted to give an order-making power. We are always unhappy with open-ended, order-making powers for the Secretary of State, because at some stage matters can go through on the nod under the negative resolution procedure. That is why we considered that it would be better to have the affirmative resolution procedure. 
 The Minister knows that we will be returning to the issue, and I hope that the Government will use the affirmative resolution procedure more often. He has put his views on the record, and I have put our views on the record. I do not wish to pursue the matter. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 30 - Hearing evidence through television links

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 86A, in
clause 30, page 17, line 25, leave out 'appears to'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 44, in 
clause 30, page 17, line 25, after 'State' insert 'knows'.
 Amendment No. 45, in 
clause 30, page 17, line 26, at end insert— 
 '(2A) A request under subsection (1) must— 
 (a) specify the reason why it is not desirable or possible for the witness or expert to attend in person; 
 (b) give the name of the judicial authority and the names of the persons who will be conducting the hearing; and 
 (c) state that the witness is willing to give evidence by television link in the proceedings before that court.'.
 Amendment No. 46, in 
clause 30, page 17, line 27, leave out 
 'Unless he considers it inappropriate to do so'.
 Amendment No. 51, in 
schedule 2, page 65, line 5, leave out 'appears to him to' and insert 'he is satisfied will'.

James Paice: I am interested in the way that this afternoon's proceedings are going. We seem to have lost the massed ranks on the Government Benches. They might be sitting by the telephone waiting for a call—on such occasions hope springs eternal. However, there will be disappointments. [Interruption.] The Whip is laughing as if he knows the inner secrets of what is going on. Whips always pretend to do that, whether they know or not. If the Minister is called away suddenly during the course of the afternoon, we shall understand why—much as I should like to think it would be because he realised he had lost the argument, it might not be.
 Clause 30 relates to the hearing of witnesses in the UK using television links to a court in another country. Amendments Nos. 86A and 44 do stand separately and must run together. Amendment No. 51 is the same and applies to schedule 2. We are concerned about the vagueness of the statement in clause 30(2), which refers to 
''the authority in that country which appears to the Secretary of State to have the function of making requests of the kind to which this section applies.''
 The phrase ''which appears to'' is incredibly vague. Bearing in mind that we are talking about countries with which we have signed some sort of convention, we should know which authorities have the function of making requests. I tabled the amendment to extract from the Minister why that subsection has to be so vague. Will the Government contemplate granting the power to hear witnesses in UK courts through television links to a court overseas if the Secretary of State is not absolutely satisfied that the request comes from a body that has the right power? The phrase ''which appears to'' is vague and, given that the geography of the world keeps changing and countries break up as well as join together, it is essential that we know which authority can make such a request. 
 Amendment No. 45 would insert a new subsection in clause 30. It supports what I have been saying in so far as it would ensure that the Secretary of State is 
 properly assured of why the request is being made. It specifically states that the request should 
''(a) specify the reason why it is not desirable or possible for the witness or the expert to attend in person; 
 (b) give the name of the . . . authority and the names of the persons who will be conducting the hearing; and 
 (c) state that the witness is willing to give evidence by television link''
 in such proceedings. The amendment should be accepted not only because it would support the obligation behind the request, but because it has been taken from the text of the second additional protocol to article 10 of the mutual legal assistance convention—those words appear in paragraph 8 on page 7. If we have already signed up to that convention—and we have, which is why we are passing this Bill—I do not understand why that text cannot be in the Bill. 
 The amendment is reasonable. The Minister—I was going to say the Secretary of State, but I should not jump to conclusions—will probably say that it is not necessary because all that information will be given in the request anyway. If that is the case, it enhances my argument that it should be included in the Bill. 
 When we consider proposed legislation, we must bear in mind not only the situation today, but what things might be like while it is still current. It is important to consider authorities in other countries, for we do not know what might happen to the office of Secretary of State in years to come. It is important that the Secretary of State should be given the authority, so that if the request does not contain all the information he needs, he can refuse to accede to it, even if, as the Minister will no doubt assure me, he can refuse to accede to it anyway. 
 Amendment No. 46 is a probing amendment. Subsection (3) starts with a vague piece of phraseology: 
''Unless he considers it inappropriate to do so the Secretary of State must by notice in writing nominate a court''.
 What could be construed as inappropriate? There seems to be a change in drafting jargon running through much of the Bill. On various occasions I and other hon. Members have questioned the vagueness of some aspects of the Bill; this is another example. What does it mean? What checks and balances are there on the Secretary of State as to whether something is inappropriate? What if he believed, for example, that the authority in the country that made the request was not the proper authority? What if he did not agree with the Government of that country? Is that inappropriate enough for him to nominate the court in writing? It is odd that such a vague term is used. 
 The amendment does not require much introduction; it is a challenge to what on earth the Government mean by placing something so vague in the Bill. What kinds of example did they think about in which the Secretary of State might consider things to be inappropriate? The group of amendments covers various issues surrounding the role of the Secretary of State in making decisions on a request to hear witnesses in the UK through TV links. All the amendments are important. I look forward to 
 hearing the Minister's response to various issues that bear further investigation.

Bob Ainsworth: Whether or not anyone knows what has happened in the reshuffle, the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire should reflect on the fact that I have failed to resist two resistable amendments. Perhaps I am already aware of my demise and have become rather demob happy—[Laughter.] He should bear that in mind.

David Cairns: If he is going, can he not take us with him?

Bob Ainsworth: There are too few of you here.
 The amendments relate to requests received by the UK to provide for TV evidence at the request of an overseas authority. Amendments Nos. 86A and 44 relate to authorities that may request assistance via a TV link. I shall explain which authorities will have the function of making requests, and I hope that that will deal with the hon. Gentleman's concerns. 
 The purpose of the drafting of subsection (2) is to give flexibility to ensure that the UK is in a position to consider all requests made by legitimate overseas authorities, however those are defined in different national legislation, while retaining the final discretion for the Secretary of State about whether to execute the request in a particular case. I understand what the hon. Gentleman says. There is an issue to do with flexibility and checks and balances. We are not talking about extradition or intrusive surveillance: we are talking about someone giving evidence via television link. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will bear that in mind. To what degree do we want to tie down in statute the flexibility in this particular case? It would be useful to maintain that flexibility. 
 What are these authorities? In the case of the signatories to the 1959 Council of Europe convention on mutual legal assistance, which forms the basis of MLAC, judicial authorities are defined by each state. Therefore, where we are dealing with another Council of Europe country, the appropriate authority will be set out in its Council of Europe declaration. 
 However, in the case of both Council of Europe and non-Council of Europe states, the authority will be a court, a prosecuting authority or other authority with a role in the investigation and prosecution of crimes and in mutual legal assistance. In some cases, a central authority might be responsible for making requests of this nature: the Home Office may perform that function in certain regards, and there might be a similar organisation in the requesting country that handles such cases on its behalf. The Secretary of State's discretion regarding execution provides a safeguard against requests from inappropriate authorities. 
 Amendment No. 45 would require incoming requests from overseas authorities to include three pieces of information, which are specified. The first two are requirements of article 10 of MLAC. However, their inclusion in the Bill is unnecessary. The drafting gives the Secretary of State the ability to refuse to nominate a court for a hearing if all the requirements are not met. He will make his decision 
 with the MLAC requirements in mind. The matters listed in the amendment are not the only pieces of information that must be included in a request for a hearing by video link. All requests, including those for a hearing by video link, must include information referred to in article 14 of the European mutual assistance convention. Those requirements are not listed in the 1990 Act or the Bill. The decision not to list the additional requirements here is consistent with that approach. 
 It was suggested in another place that inclusion of these matters in the Bill would help to ensure that witnesses were fairly treated and that countries did not abuse the opportunity to take evidence by video link. However, these requirements are not about the protection of witnesses: they are mainly practical matters to ensure that administrative arrangements for the hearing can be made. Protection of witnesses' rights is adequately provided for, particularly in schedule 2. 
 To impose the third proposed condition—that a witness is willing to give evidence—would be contrary to the provisions of MLAC, so we cannot agree to its inclusion. It is only possible to impose such a condition in relation to hearing accused persons if member states choose, in accordance with article 10(9), to extend the provision to hearing accused persons. The Government are not proposing to enable accused persons to be heard in this way. 
 Subsection (3) gives the Secretary of State discretion not to take forward a request. Amendment No. 46 would remove that discretion. The provision will enable the Secretary of State not to comply with a request when that request would contravene national law. It retains an overall discretion for the Secretary of State in all cases, while not being unduly prescriptive in the conditions that it imposes on overseas requests. That would enable the Secretary of State to refuse requests if they do not contain the necessary information. 
 We consider that amendment No. 51 is a drafting amendment, and that the current drafting is appropriate. It would require the Secretary of State to be satisfied that the overseas authority has the specified function, which reflects an earlier amendment to clause 30. In the context of schedule 2, the Government consider that the current drafting has the advantage of consistency with other clauses and that the test that an authority seems to be appropriate provides sufficient safeguards. It may be that different authorities are involved in making arrangements for the protection of witnesses rather than making the request for the hearing. Dedicated witness protection teams or the police might be involved in the requesting country, for example, in the request that is being made. 
 I understand the hon. Gentleman's argument, but we are not surrendering people. We are obliging them to give evidence by video link, if abroad. There are so many variables. We are not necessarily talking about 
 convention countries only, but any country. There is a desire to maintain flexibility and we are concerned about the degree to which we want to tie down the Secretary of State and Executive to respond appropriately and be able to block inappropriate responses. I do not believe that the safeguards for which the hon. Gentleman is calling are necessary. The schedule provides good and comprehensive safeguards.

James Paice: Having heard the Minister's opening remarks, I hope sincerely that they were made in jest and that we are not about to see his demise. If we are, it shows what desperate straits the Government are in. The hon. Gentleman has gained huge respect from this side of the House for his ability and diligence. If he remains in the Government, as I sincerely hope he does, it should be at a higher rather than a lower level—well, there cannot be a lower level. [Laughter.] I do not know why members of the Committee are laughing. I have been there. I know exactly the low level that the Minister occupies, because I used to occupy it. I am not beating around the bush, even though when an hon. Member does not have such a job, he sits on the Back Benches praying to goodness that perhaps the phone will ring. I am fully cognisant of the reality of the situation.
 As for amendments Nos. 86A and 44, I understand the Minister's reason for wanting flexibility. Of course, he is right. We are not discussing matters as heavy and intrusive as extradition. In some ways, however, his closing remark underlined the issues involved. He might want to reflect on it. He said that the issue applies not only to convention countries, but to any country. On one hand, that requires flexibility but, on the other, it would increase the possibility of a request coming from an authority that was not the right authority. I am slightly more worried about the phrase ''appears to''. It is easy to imagine an authority masquerading as the right authority, even if it were not. It may be following a constitutional change. There may have been a coup, for example, in a particular country. 
 I come now to amendment No. 45. I take the Minister's point that the protection of witnesses is slightly different from paragraphs (a) and (b) in the amendment. Nevertheless, all paragraphs in the amendment are important. If the amendment would contravene the convention I can understand why the Minister would wish to reject it, but as proposed paragraphs (a) and (b) come within the convention, I am less certain about the wisdom of resisting it. 
 On amendment No. 46, the Minister again pleaded the need for flexibility. I understand his arguments; we are talking about a matter of judgment, relating to checks and balances and flexibility. I hope that, in future, no Secretary of State errs in the wrong direction, but on this occasion I am happy to accept that there is a need for flexibility. However, it has been useful to challenge the Minister on some of the more vague phrases that are creeping into the Bill. In light of his remarks, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 137, in
clause 30, page 17, line 28, after 'court', insert 'or other place'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 47, in 
clause 30, page 17, line 29, at end insert— 
 '(3A) The provisions of subsections (4) and (5) shall be drawn to the attentions of any person giving evidence by virtue of this section before he gives evidence.'.
 Amendment No. 48, in 
clause 30, page 17, line 32, at end insert 
 '(unless the conduct in question would not constitute contempt of the court in the country outside the United Kingdom before which the proceedings in questions are being carried on)'.
 Amendment No. 50, in 
schedule 2, page 64, line 30, at end insert— 
 '(3) The nominated court must be notified that the witness is willingly giving evidence by television link.'
 Amendment No. 54, in 
schedule 2, page 65, line 38, at end insert— 
 '(16A) The nominated court shall intervene where it considers it necessary to do so in order to safeguard the rights of the witness.'.
 Amendment No. 139, in 
clause 31, page 18, line 22, after 'court', insert 'or other place'.
 Amendment No. 141, in 
schedule 2, page 65, line 8, at end insert 
 'to ensure that proceedings are understood by 
 (a) the witness or witnesses; and 
 (b) the nominated court.'.
 Amendment No. 142, in 
schedule 2, page 66, line 2, at end insert 
 'to ensure that proceedings are understood by 
 (a) the witness or witnesses; and 
 (b) the nominated court.'.

David Heath: There are two pairs of amendments in our name in the group: Nos. 137 and 139, which would add ''or other place''; and amendments Nos. 141 and 142, which deal with interpreters.
 Amendments Nos. 137 and 139 are, essentially, probing amendments; I accept straight away that they are not proper amendments that can pass into law. I am seeking from the Minister a definition of what comprises a court, in the context of the clause. Is a court any place at which a presiding judicial officer—either a magistrate or a judge—sits, or does it have the geographical sense of a courthouse? I ask because I can conceive of many circumstances in which a convening court will not have the facilities for television links; it might not even have telephone links, although that is less likely. 
 Also, there may be circumstances in which it is not possible for a witness to be present in a courthouse equipped with television links, and it might then be better to make arrangements from another place. I had two examples in mind. The first was that of very remote communities that might have access to a satellite television studio, but not to a courthouse that is so equipped, and under those circumstances, for the convenience of all concerned, it would be better for 
 a court to convene in the television studio. The other circumstance is when a witness cannot be moved out of a hospital; it might be more appropriate for a television link to be brought to the witness than for the witness to be brought to a television link. It may be that the Bill already allows for that, and that a court is defined as anywhere that— 
 The Chairman's attention having been called to the fact that seven members were not present, he suspended the proceedings; and other Members having come into the room and seven Members being present, the proceedings were resumed.

Alan Hurst: Order. We now return to amendment No. 137.

David Heath: Thank you, Mr. Hurst. I am glad that we are now quorate again, and that the Committee members on the Government Benches who were assiduously sitting by their phones have returned to the fold in order to concentrate on the proceedings.
 It is unclear to me whether the court is the institution or the locality in this instance. The Minister may be able to help me on that, and if there is a deficiency here, we might be able to correct it—although, as I have said, probably not through the words that I have proposed. 
 The other point that I want to make relates to amendments Nos. 141 and 142, which amend Schedule 2. I wish to identify what precisely the Government intend to provide in terms of interpretation. Uncharacteristically, Lord Bassam of Brighton seemed to have got himself into a bit of a muddle in another place on this subject. There is a need for translation facilities, but there is a need for that at two points. First, it is essential that the witness can understand the proceedings of the court to which his evidence is being transmitted; otherwise, he cannot be adequately protected or effectively give evidence. Therefore, interpretation facilities are necessary that allow that witness to understand the proceedings. However, it is also essential that the presiding judge in the United Kingdom court is able to understand the proceedings—what is going on at the other end of the television or telephone link and what the witness is saying—so that they can provide the protection under the law that is envisaged. 
 Therefore, there are two points of interpretation. Lord Bassam first indicated that that would be available, but he then spoiled that by suggesting that he would expect the relevant proceedings to take place in English, which is surprising under the circumstances, because a Portuguese court that is interviewing a Portuguese witness who happens to be on the Isle of Orkney will be very unlikely to take the view that the English language is the most appropriate medium in which to conduct its business. There will be a further complication if the witness in the Portuguese court is a monoglot Serbo-Croat: the proceedings from—let us say—Lisbon are in Portuguese, the witness gives their evidence in Serbo-Croat, and a poor English or Scots judge has to try to understand what is happening because, although they have no direct interest in the proceedings, they are, effectively, 
 the umpire whose role is to ensure that proceedings are in good order. 
 I am seeking to clarify the muddle that we got into in another place and to ensure that those two levels of interpretation will be available. Sometimes both levels will not be required because only two languages will be involved; but at other times three languages will be involved, and in both instances interpretation facilities will be necessary if everyone is to have the safety of knowing that their proceedings are understood. That is why I tabled these amendments.

Nick Hawkins: I shall be brief. Some Conservative Committee members' amendments—Nos. 47, 48, 50 and 54—have been grouped with those of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome.
 There is one matter that I should correct for the Committee. There is a typographical error in amendment No. 47, which I am sure is our fault: it states ''attentions'', whereas that word should be ''attention''—that is only one letter, but I thought I should put it on the record. 
 In amendment No. 47, we are suggesting that it would be sensible to make it clear in the Bill that witnesses are to have the provisions of this law explained to them in advance. I hope that the Minister will not resist the spirit of our amendment, although he may not be able to accept the wording. 
 I very much echo the comments of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome on the confusion that occurred in another place. I shall not bore the Committee by repeating what was said there, as he admirably summarised that. Earlier I referred to this from a sedentary position—sotto voce—as a ''Bassam special'', which is the phrase used by Baroness Anelay of St. Johns. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that there was a great deal of confusion on the Government side in another place. One only has to read the Hansard of the debate to see that. 
 Amendment No. 48 would insert a new condition on whether conduct would be in contempt of court in the country outside the UK. We think that the rest of clause 30 should be valid only if the conduct was in contempt of court in the country outside the UK. I appreciate that in another place it was said that British courts could not judge on every occasion whether something was in contempt of court in another country. Nevertheless, we thought it worth having a debate to find out whether the Minister had had any further reflections since the debate in another place. 
 Amendments Nos. 50 and 54 would amend schedule 2, and are related to the same matters. On amendment No. 50, we feel strongly that it is vital to include in the Bill a requirement that the nominated court is notified that the witness is willingly giving evidence. There was an important debate in another place at columns GC112 to 114. I point in particular to what Baroness Anelay said at column GC114. I know that the Minister is aware of what was said, so I shall 
 not take up Committee time by quoting extensively from that debate. 
 Amendment No. 54 would add a new subsection (16A), which contains an overarching witness protection provision, to part 2 of schedule 2. It is sensible to include that in the Bill. The words of proposed new subsection (16A) make it clear beyond doubt that the witness is to have that protection. I cannot see any good reason why the Minister would resist that. I hope that the Minister stands up and says, ''Well, all right then, we'll accept amendment No. 54.'' He might do so because he is demob happy or for any other reason. I also agree with the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome. They are sensible, and I need not go through them again. 
 I hope that the Minister will consider the matters that we have raised. We have tried to be sensible and constructive; we genuinely think the amendments will improve the Bill and provide clarity about the protection of witnesses. We think that that is important, and I know that the Minister does too.

Bob Ainsworth: The hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I do not deal with the amendments in the order in which they have been listed.
 Amendment No. 47 would introduce a statutory requirement in relation to contempt of court and perjury to inform witnesses of their rights and obligations under clause 30. However, schedule 2 contains sufficient safeguards for the rights of witnesses, so the amendment is unnecessary. Witnesses who provide evidence in this way will be subject to the same rules of contempt of court and perjury as would apply if they were testifying in a normal, domestic court proceeding. They are also protected by any additional rights and privileges that they would have if they had been physically present at the overseas proceedings. They are therefore doubly protected, by the proceedings, protections and rules of court of our own country and those of overseas jurisdictions. 
 Amendment No. 48 would limit the circumstances in which a witness summoned to give evidence before a UK court would be deemed to be in contempt of court. An undue burden would be placed on the domestic court if it had to establish whether an act by a witness in its presence, which would be contempt of court in the UK, would also be contempt of court in the overseas country. That would require detailed knowledge of many other legal systems, which is impractical. The clause is designed to protect the domestic court system, so that if a witness committed contempt of our court, action could be taken against that person. 
 Amendment No. 50 would restrict the power of the court to secure the attendance of witnesses to circumstances in which the witness is willing to attend. That is unacceptable for the reasons I gave on amendment No. 45. The UK cannot restrict the application of the provisions to circumstances in which witnesses are willing to give evidence without falling foul of article 10 of the MLAC. That applies to all witnesses, not just those who are willing. It is appropriate for there to be a power to compel 
 witnesses to attend. We will achieve that by issuing a summons. That would be done if they were required to appear as a witness in a domestic criminal proceeding. 
 The hon. Gentleman made a special plea for amendment No. 54. That would replicate the provision in part 1 of the schedule—on the intervention of the court to safeguard the rights of witnesses in television link hearings—in part 2, which deals with telephone hearings. The Government do not think that that is necessary or appropriate. It could have a potentially confusing effect. Under clause 30 and part 1 of the schedule, which governs television links, witnesses may be required to attend. In fact, they are compellable, subject to the privileges referred to in paragraph (9). Clause 31 and part 2 of the schedule, on the other hand, offer no more than a facility to give evidence by telephone. There is no power to secure the attendance of a witness if they are not willing to attend, and they cannot be required to give evidence unwillingly. The two proceedings are quite different. To add an equivalent to paragraph (5) to part 3 of the schedule would cause confusion about the position of the witness before the court. 
 On amendments Nos. 137 and 138 tabled by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, there is no need for the Secretary of State to nominate any place other than a court to hear witnesses by television or telephone link—both kinds of hearing would be conducted by a court. If we received a request to arrange such hearings on behalf of overseas authorities, we would generally use magistrates courts. More than 150 magistrates courts have been set up to receive remand TV links; those currently only operate between courts and prisons for use in remand hearings. However, the technology is in place, and linking with overseas courts would be technically straightforward. The witness would be in a UK court and the camera would be linked to the court in the UK. 
 All such hearings must be conducted before a court. Generally, the court nominated by the Secretary of State would be the one most conveniently located for the witness that has the necessary facilities. Whether the link was set up in the usual courtroom or outside it is irrelevant. The court would be conducting the hearing, so it would be nominated. As for remote communities and potential problems, I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying. The court might nominate facilities outside its existing court buildings, but they would be designated as part of the court. On a Scottish island, for example, the court could designate a particular building on the island, which would become part of the court and be covered for convenience. There would be no need for any amendment. 
 I emphasise that interpretation would always be provided in respect of both the judicial authority and the witness. Let me say to the hon. Gentleman that amendments Nos. 141 and 142 are not necessary. It is not that we do not agree with him, and I hope that I can reassure him that they are not necessary. 
 It is likely to be a frequent scenario that one party—the witness or the domestic judicial authority—does not understand the language in which the overseas 
 proceedings are conducted. It is superfluous to refer to the court and the witness explicitly when making reference to rules of court. We may receive a request from Poland where the witness is Polish and would understand the proceedings. However, the court here would not understand them and therefore could not fulfil its obligations under clauses 30 and 31 and schedule 2, which impose responsibilities on the nominating court to protect the rights of the witness and the fundamental principles of domestic law. It needs to understand the proceedings to fulfil those responsibilities, so interpretation would have to be provided. 
 Let us suppose that a witness did not speak English, but we were conducting proceedings with the United States of America, so the court here would be able to understand them. If the witness did not understand the language of the proceedings in the requesting country, the court would not be serving the interests of justice or protecting the rights of the witness if it did not provide interpretation for him. Therefore, interpretation will always be provided if it is needed by the witness or the court. It must always be available. It is not necessary for the proceedings to take place in English. In the case of the Polish witness and the Polish jurisdiction, they could take place in Poland, but the court would need an English interpretation. I hope that I have reassured the hon. Gentleman that interpretation will always be provided. It is a requirement to ensure that justice is done. We do not disagree with the amendments, but they are not necessary.

David Heath: I thank the Minister for clearing up the confusion that was created by rather contradictory statements made by Lord Bassam in another place. The Minister has said explicitly today that it is necessary for both the witness and the court to understand the proceedings and that interpretation will be available to achieve that. That is the assurance that I sought by tabling my amendments and I am entirely content with it. I am also grateful to the Minister for his explanation that a court is the place where the court chooses to constitute itself, which need not be solely in a courthouse, and that there is provision, where necessary, for the court to move outside the premises of the courthouse and constitute its court elsewhere for the instances that I gave.
 The hon. Gentleman raised one other issue in passing, which is that of a prisoner not being brought into court, but being kept in prison. I presume that, under those circumstances, it would be necessary to constitute the court in the prison, rather than to use the link from the prison to the court and then for the court to communicate with the overseas court. That is perhaps a conundrum too far.

Bob Ainsworth: It would seem to me that that is a possibility, in theory. There must already be provisions, because there is coverage on remand, and if the court chose to constitute itself in a prison, the same situation would apply. If that is not the case, I shall come back to the hon. Gentleman, but that would be common sense. If the court can extend itself beyond its boundaries to cover remote communities, it
 can probably do the same to cover people incarcerated in prison.

David Heath: That is certainly the common-sense interpretation. I am grateful to the Minister, and on the basis of the assurances that he has been happy to give me, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 138, in
clause 30, page 18, line 3, at end insert 
 'but may subsequently be used as evidence, if admissible, in proceedings in the United Kingdom.'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 140, in
clause 31, page 18, line 39, at end insert 
 'but may subsequently be used as evidence, if admissible, in proceedings in the United Kingdom.'.

David Heath: This is another probing amendment. There is a clear provision in subsection (7), which says:
''Subject to subsections (4) and (5) and the provisions of that Schedule, evidence given pursuant to this section is not to be treated for any purpose as evidence given in proceedings in the United Kingdom.''
 I understand that the evidence is not before a British court; it is administered partly by it, but it is not evidence in proceedings in the United Kingdom. My small concern is whether that precludes evidence given under those circumstances from being used subsequently in proceedings in a United Kingdom court. It seems that that might not be the intention. 
 Let me give an instance. Supposing the witness in a case in a foreign country looked up suddenly, halfway through giving evidence, which is sworn, is before a district judge, and is recorded, and said, ''Oh, by the way, I killed Mrs. Jones last week.'' It would be absurd for that evidence not to be brought up in subsequent British proceedings in court—but, of course, only if admissible; and that is a big question.

Stephen Hesford: But that is the point—if it is admissible. If it were not, what the hon. Gentleman says would have no point.

David Heath: I am trying to discover whether, all other things being equal, and there being no reason to suppose that what was said was not admissible because of any other consideration in UK law, the evidence would be admissible and would not be precluded by the clause. I would like some clarity on that. The hon. Gentleman will recall our long debates on hearsay evidence in connection with the Criminal Justice Bill. The clause refers to privileged, rather high-powered hearsay evidence; it is hearsay in the hearing of a court, a district judge and a recorder who is providing a record of the proceedings to the satisfaction of the United Kingdom courts. The evidence is really classy hearsay, in the context of what was envisaged under the Criminal Justice Bill.

Stephen Hesford: I am not sure where our discussion is going, but I think that the hon.
 Gentleman is wrong; we are not talking about hearsay. If it came from the defendant's mouth, it is direct evidence against him, not hearsay.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman has the advantage of me in being a lawyer—

Siobhain McDonagh: Disadvantage.

David Heath: If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I shall continue.
 The evidence is not coming directly from the witness's mouth, because we are not talking about proceedings in a UK court. That witness may not give the same evidence in proceedings before a UK court. As what is said will be brought before the court as a result of the record of the proceedings, which are not before a UK court and have been witnessed by a district judge and the court authorities, it constitutes hearsay evidence under the interpretation normally accorded it. It is not direct evidence because it has not been given in the context of the proceedings of a UK court. Unless I have completely misdirected myself, it seems that, all things considered and provided that the evidence is not prevented from being admissible in other circumstances and is available to a British court as a record of proceedings, it should be potentially used in proceedings against the witness or anyone else. Despite the Minister's attempts to divert me from such a course, I wonder whether he believes that such action is possible and whether subsection (7) would prevent it from happening. I might be making a tortuous point, but there is the potential for such action to happen. I would hate it for us to have got it wrong.

James Paice: I support the hon. Gentleman's probing amendments. We are on new territory and discussing the giving of evidence by telephone, which is not admissible in British courts. The hon. Gentleman was right to want to explore a range of issues with the Government. It is clear from clause 31(4) that the giving of the evidence will be taking place physically in a British court, but that does not mean that it is taking place within British court proceedings, and under their constraints. Such matters need to be more clearly understood. The Minister must explain them.
 Secondly, although the giving of evidence by telephone is not permitted in British court proceedings—although I consider that it is perfectly correct—what the witness says may be heard other than by the telephone. Court officials will be present during the proceedings who hear literally rather than by telephone. With respect to the hon. Member for Wirral, West (Stephen Hesford), the matter is more confusing than he suggested when he referred to admissibility. We know that telephone evidence is not admissible in this country. If a person listened to evidence being given by telephone, it is not admissible. However, if a court official was physically sitting at the hearing, heard the witness give evidence and made the admission to which the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome referred, it would not have been heard over the telephone and that should be taken into account. The hon. Gentleman has put his finger on an important point, and I am interested in how the Minister will wriggle out of it.

Bob Ainsworth: The Minister will do his best. As it is Thursday afternoon, I cannot resist sharing something with the Committee. I have a note that says, ''Resist. These are new amendments. We have no idea what their purpose is. They do not make sense as drafted. You might wish to offer to write to the hon. Gentleman.''
 I have a couple of comments to make about what has been said. The Committee must bear in mind that the telephone evidence was given willingly and that there was no compulsion on the individual to give it. That is different from video link evidence. I say to the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire that we think that its use in domestic proceedings is precluded. We may have to seek the evidence ourselves from the overseas authority, in which case it could be used. However, the point that the hon. Gentleman makes is valid: it may have been heard, so it might be admissible. That is our view at present. 
 I will do what my note advises me to do, which is to get some consideration on it and respond to the Committee in writing.

James Paice: I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, and for saying that. However, he should reflect on what he said earlier when he deliberates on this matter. Evidence that is given over the telephone is not admissible in British courts. Even if we get evidence from another country, it could not be used in a British court because it would have been gained over the telephone—but he seemed to suggest that it could be used.

Bob Ainsworth: No, I was making a point about there being two different types of evidence. I was also seeking to allude to the fact that the person was not obliged to give the evidence by telephone: if he was overheard, and rendered himself liable in a British court, more fool he. We must clarify the position, because this is an important point and we need to understand exactly what we are doing.

David Heath: I agree with the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire that evidence that is given by telephone to an overseas court cannot come back here and be admissible. However, under schedule 2(10), the rules of court
''must make provision—
(a) for the drawing up of a record of the hearing''.
 Therefore, this is not a question of what some court official may remember. A court official will be producing a record of the hearing. Will that record subsequently be available for use in a British court? The Minister's initial response suggested that that was precluded, and I am seeking to ensure that it is not, because it might be a valuable piece of evidence.

Bob Ainsworth: The hon. Gentleman tabled his amendments yesterday, and they address an interesting area, which we need to examine. I will write to the Committee before Report so that it knows exactly what the situation is.

David Heath: That was extremely helpful. I am not trying to catch anybody out. The thought that this might be a problem occurred to me only two days ago.
 I am sorry if the Minister's officials were baffled when I first tabled the amendment.
 We have had a useful debate, and the Minister now understands my point and accepts that it has some validity, even if I am not right. I look forward to reading his letter, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 30 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 31 - Hearing witnesses in the uk by telephone

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 49, in
clause 31, page 18, line 20, at end insert— 
 '(d) confirm that the witness has received independent legal advice'.
 After the previous debate, I would be interested to be a fly on the wall when the Minister has a private session with his officials later. I am reminded of an occasion when I was occupying a similar role in a different Department. I foolishly stated to a large audience that the speech that I had been given was so boring that I was not going to deliver it, and that I had written one of my own. Immediately afterwards, a grovelling official came up to me to apologise for writing such a boring speech. I had not realised that she had been present when I made that statement. It is very easy to say the wrong thing. 
 As for amendment No. 49, we have cantered round the course in a different context. However, where we are seeking to require that the witnesses received independent legal advice, there is a unique context. We have been discussing that we are addressing something that does not exist in the British legal system—the giving of evidence by telephone. For a witness who may well be accustomed to the British system, this would be completely foreign—I use that word advisedly—territory: they will not know about it. If a witness is giving evidence by telephone—albeit accepting the Minister's earlier comment that that is voluntary—there is a case for saying that the Secretary of State should be sure that that witness has received the proper legal advice about what he may or may not be doing and the possible implications of that, especially in the light of our debate. Whatever the Minister's deliberations may demonstrate, there could be legal implications at home for what the witness may or may not say over the telephone to someone else. That is important, because we are dealing with something that is novel in the British legal system—that the witness should be given some legal advice. It is right that that should be included in the Bill. 
 The Minister may well refer to the fact that that was debated in the other place—it was—but the answer received then was extremely thin; it seemed to suggest that the witness was already sufficiently protected by schedule 2. That answer is not adequate. Part 2 of schedule 2—''Evidence given by telephone''—refers to the notification of the witness and the conduct of the hearing. It says simply: 
''The evidence is to be given in accordance with the laws of that country'',
 where the court proceedings would take place. Nowhere in part 2 is there any reference to the witness being informed of their rights, or of the legal implications of giving evidence by telephone to the country in question, or of the implications back home that may be consequential on that. That is a short, simple point, but we are talking about something novel in the British judicial system and it deserves particular investigation. I hope that the Minister will understand the importance of that matter, so that British citizens, and others who may be brought to use the system under clause 31, are fully aware of their rights.

Bob Ainsworth: Although we understand the desire to protect the rights of witnesses, we do not consider that the amendments are necessary. Witnesses agreeing to give evidence in such a way have sufficient protection. Article 11(2) of the MLAC provides that witnesses may be heard by telephone only if they agree to the hearing. There is no question of issuing summonses to unwilling witnesses, because there is no power to summons witnesses for telephone hearings. The Bill provides for a court to make arrangements to hear evidence, but not for it to compel witnesses.
 Under domestic law, there is no obligation for anyone appearing as a witness to seek legal advice, nor is there any automatic right to it. It would not be right or consistent to require that a person has received legal advice in such circumstances, when the UK does not require that in respect of domestic criminal proceedings, either for witnesses, whether willing or unwilling, or even defendants, who are not covered by the provision. 
 The clause as drafted requires the requesting country to confirm that the witness is willing to give evidence by telephone in proceedings before the overseas court. As an additional safeguard, the court is also required to be satisfied that the witness is willing, thereby protecting him if, having agreed to give evidence, he changes his mind by the time of the hearing. 
 The provision does not have general application and we do not expect it to be used frequently—not all member states are able to request that kind of assistance. We understand that it is mainly used by Scandinavian countries. Schedule 2 provides that such hearings, like those via television link, will be conducted under the supervision of the requesting state and in accordance with its law. 
 That is our fairly firm position. The only doubt that creeps into my mind is our preceding conversation and the issue of circumstances. I am not sure whether that would impact on anything, because there is no requirement to ensure that legal advice is given to witnesses in domestic proceedings. The witnesses must be certified as being willing, and the court must check that they are willing. To insist that they receive legal advice is an unnecessary step.

James Paice: I hear what the Minister says. In the light of earlier amendments, and the fact that he says that he will go away and think about them, he might
 want to reflect on this one too. I understand what he is saying, but because we are talking about something that is completely new for a British system—giving evidence by telephone—this is a special case. However, it is not appropriate to pursue that now, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 - Evidence given by television link or telephone

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 52, in
schedule 2, page 65, line 8, at end insert 
 'including those competent in sign language'.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 55, in
schedule 2, page 66, line 2, at end insert 
 'including those competent in sign language'.

Nick Hawkins: I can be brief. Both amendments would have the same effect, and would insert in the schedule the phrase,
''including those competent in sign language''.
 There was a brief debate in another place on this subject, and on that occasion Lord Bassam of Brighton sought to reassure Baroness Anelay of St. Johns. Having read that debate, I am not clear whether Lord Bassam had got it right. It was helpful of him to put it on the record that he felt that sign language 
''must be a language all of its own and therefore I see no problem with that.''
 He also said: 
''We see no reason why the term 'interpreters' should not include those competent in sign language.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 23 January 2003; Vol. 643, c. GC116.]
 If that is so, it would be helpful to avoid doubt and include it in the Bill. I hope that the Minister will be happy to do that. Baroness Anelay was, of course, working on behalf of the British Deaf Association and the Royal National Institute for Deaf People—two extremely worthwhile organisations, the work of which I am sure that Members and peers on both sides of both Houses would support. 
 Years ago, when I was working in the courts, I had a lot of experience of interpretation of different forms. In the spirit of Thursday afternoon—as the Minister puts it—perhaps I should briefly share a couple of experiences that show how easy it is to get things wrong, not just in relation to sign language for the deaf, but in interpretation of other languages. Two particular experiences from my years of practice at the Bar spring to mind. I realise that the following might present one or two challenges to the Hansard writer, so I apologise. 
 It was well known in the courts around the west midlands—my chambers were in Birmingham and Northampton—that there were two groups of interpreters that worked for the Crown courts and the magistrates courts. One group had extensive experience of working overseas in Asian countries. It contained people who had retired from the Army in 
 India who had learned a number of languages on the subcontinent. They were precise, knowledgeable and always gave an accurate interpretation. The second, less reliable group of interpreters, instead of interpreting what the witness said, used to try to help the witness with his statement or the defendant with the case. 
 There could be a situation in court in which a lengthy reply was given in another language. I cannot speak any Asian languages, but it would be something like, ''Blblblblll Blblblblll Blblblll''—which will be a challenge for the Hansard writer. The best way to describe it for the benefit of Hansard would be to say, ''a long phrase in an Asian language.'' The interpreter would then translate that as, ''The witness says yes.'' or ''The witness says no.'' It would be clear that the witness or the defendant had said a great deal more than that. Therefore, the interpreter would not be assisting the court. 
 The other experience that I had in a long and big fraud case was a situation in which all the prosecution witnesses, who were crucial to the prosecution's case, were Breton farmers, none of whom spoke a word of English. Unfortunately, the principal witness had had a tracheotomy, which many hon. Members will remember was the operation that the famous actor, Jack Hawkins—no relation to me, I am sad to say—had undergone. It meant that the witness had to speak through a hole in his throat, having had an operation for throat cancer. A special microphone had to be installed in the Crown court in Northampton, so that he could be understood. 
 However, not only was the witness speaking French, but in a Breton dialect. Unfortunately, the prosecution chose as the interpreter a lady who spoke fluent French and English, but who had never acted as a court interpreter. From the point of view of the Court Service, that was a catastrophic error, because it meant that the interpreter would have huge problems. She was not from Brittany and did not understand the Breton dialect. What made the situation even worse was that a crucial part of the allegation that the prosecution was making in respect of this fraud related to how agricultural markets operated in Brittany. 
 In this country, we might call the way in which such markets worked a candle auction or a clock auction. I was one of the defending barristers, and I know that the prosecution experienced enormous difficulties. The Breton farmer would say through the throat microphone, ''Il y a une horloge.'' The interpreter would say, ''Zer is a clock.'' We spent literally hours—I kid the Committee not—trying to work out how on earth the Breton potato and wheat markets worked, through an interpreter, with all the difficulties that that involved. I hope that I have described the sensitivity of problems of interpretation that can arise in courts. 
Stephen Hesford rose—

Nick Hawkins: I will give way to the hon. Gentleman in a moment, although I am sure that you will not want us to be detained too long with my recollections, Mr. Hurst. I must explain why, for the avoidance of doubt, I want a clear provision in the Bill that that sort of interpretation should include sign language. Finally,
 before I give way to the hon. Gentleman, I must say that we might have got along better in the fraud case if we had had sign language, rather than having someone trying to translate a Breton dialect.

Stephen Hesford: That story could be categorised as a long phrase in English, which is as impenetrable as the hon. Gentleman's ''long phrase'' in Urdu, or whatever he attempted to convey. The relevance of it escapes me. Returning to the amendment, paragraph 8 of schedule 2 states that
''Rules of court under section 49 must make provision for the use of interpreters.''
 What other definition could someone signing on behalf of someone else to demonstrate to the court what that deaf or dumb person is trying to say be listed under, other than interpreters? It is an administrative convenience for the court to obtain the right interpreter for the right purpose. It is not necessary to spell that out, otherwise we could spell out an entire list of what might be an appropriate interpreter for a specialised situation. I think that the hon. Gentleman is mistaken about that.

Nick Hawkins: The hon. Gentleman understands—I hope that he was listening to what I said—that the amendments were originally tabled in another place by Baroness Anelay of St Johns at the request of two worthwhile charities, the Royal National Institute for Deaf People and the British Deaf Association. We did not consider on reflection that the Minister's answer that it is bound to be covered because he thought that the phrase ''interpreters'' covered sign language was sufficient. We cannot see any reason why such a provision should not be in the Bill, for the avoidance of doubt. That is all I need to say.

Bob Ainsworth: Obviously, the hon. Gentleman used to enjoy himself so much in his past life, so we are all bemused about why he chose to trade it in and join us in Committee Room 9 so often. I can satisfy him by firming up the language, if that is what is upsetting him, without putting the term ''sign language'' in the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Wirral, West was right. If ''sign language'' were incorporated into the Bill, other languages would have to be covered by it.
 I say to the hon. Member for Surrey Heath that ''interpreters'' is a general term. It would include those who are competent in sign language. The provision will meet the requirements of article 10 of the convention but, in practice, domestic courts will always provide interpretation in the event of a witness not understanding the language in which the proceedings were being conducted. The interests of justice would not be served without interpretation. That applies to sign as well as to verbal interpretation. Under the terms of schedule 2, rules of court must already make provision for the use of interpreters. The term ''interpreters'' would include those competent in sign language, whenever that was necessary. I have firmed up the language used in another place, if that is what concerned the hon. Gentleman, and it should now be clear that such a provision will be made. It is inappropriate to put it in the Bill.

Nick Hawkins: I am happy with the Minister's further firming up of what his noble Friend Lord Bassam of Brighton said in another place. It was helpful. In response to his initial canard, what used to frustrate me in the seven-plus years that I was practising at the Bar was that so often I came across parts of the law that needed changing. The more frustrating it became for those of us practising in the courts, the more determined I was to try to get here to do something about it. That is why I am in this Room.

Alan Hurst: Order. I have shown a certain degree of tolerance, but we should draw a line under that point.

David Heath: I wonder whether the hon. Member for Surrey Heath can help me. I will have to display my ignorance about the number of international variants of sign language. Is it an international language? What is the possibility of finding a person who is capable of interpreting from sign language into English a version of sign language that is in another language, as it were? There may be a practical difficulty.

Nick Hawkins: I cannot answer that question off the top of my head, but the person to whom I could most usefully refer the hon. Gentleman is my hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs. Gillan). To my certain knowledge, she has been trained in signing for the deaf. There may be other hon. Members who have received the same training. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Schedule 2 agreed to.

New clause 1 - Freezing orders

'.—The Secretary of State shall appoint an independent person to make an annual report on the use of freezing orders and shall lay that report before Parliament when he receives it.'.—[Mr. Paice.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

James Paice: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
 The new clause is self-explanatory. It would require that an annual report be made to Parliament on the use of freezing orders. We debated such orders in a previous sitting, especially domestic freezing orders, which—despite the phrase—are freezing orders that apply elsewhere. My interpretation of a domestic freezing order is what I shall receive if I do not arrive home at a reasonable time tonight. 
 The whole issue of freezing orders is a significant development in the legal process. In clauses 10 to 12, we are effectively giving a British court the opportunity to protect evidence overseas before it comes to this country. As we said the other day, that opens up a range of issues. 
 The point is simple: we think that there should be an annual report, so that we can see how the legislation is settling down. It is interesting that, so far in Committee, we have referred back to the 1990 legislation on a number of occasions. Indeed, we have asked the Minister how certain parts of it have worked, and he, with respect, has not been able to answer because nobody knows. We cannot turn back 
 the clock and start investigating all those issues, but as we are doing something significantly different, it is probably right that we require annual reports, so that we know how the provisions are settling down. It may well be that in a few years everything will be running all right, and an annual report will become less relevant; however, in the early stages, such reports would be extremely useful, and I would be grateful if the Minister would consider that. 
Stephen Hesford rose—

James Paice: I have finished.

Alan Hurst: Mr. Hesford, do you wish to speak?

Stephen Hesford: I was going to intervene; I do not wish to speak.

Robert Syms: Good speech.

Alan Hurst: You are a little late for intervening, Mr. Hesford, but obviously you may address the Committee.

Bob Ainsworth: I say to the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire that the new clause would involve unnecessary bureaucracy, impose a considerable burden, and not produce any significant benefits. Orders to freeze evidence are new, and it is impossible to predict how many will be issued. It is likely that numbers will increase as the authorities become more familiar with the procedures involved. The central authority will monitor the numbers to ensure that it is appropriately staffed, in the same way that we monitor the number of mutual legal assistance requests at present.
 The effect of such orders is not fundamentally different from mutual legal assistance requests to seize evidence in another state. Freezing orders are a new, faster method of obtaining evidence, but we can already request and obtain evidence. The burden that freezing orders will place on our authorities will not be significantly different. Furthermore, the evidence provided for in clauses 10 to 12 only implements part of a requirement introduced by a framework decision on orders to freeze property and evidence. 
 Schedule 4 implements provisions relating to freezing terrorist property, and further legislation will be required to implement the provisions relating to the freezing of other property with a view to confiscation. A report on the use of freezing orders made under part 1 of the Bill would therefore present an incomplete picture. I do not know how many reports the hon. Gentleman wants. 
 A similar amendment was tabled in another place to say that Parliament should know how the provisions are working. I should say to the hon. Gentleman that information about numbers of orders will be available via parliamentary questions. In the same way, we would not reveal information about individual mutual legal assistance requests, but would be held to account in the normal way. I am sorry to say that I am not prepared to accept the hon. Gentleman's new clause, and, for the reasons that I have given, I ask him to consider withdrawing it.

James Paice: Well, there is a surprise. In light of earlier comments that the Minister made, reading from
 his brief, his point is comprehensible, and he obviously supports it. I understand that; I knew he would oppose the new clause. Governments always do, including the Government of whom I was a member. We opposed similar clauses. That is the nature of the beast, but it is still important that the issue is debated. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
 Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New clause 2 - Application of sections 30 and 31

'.—(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 30 and 31. 
 (2) Before a person gives evidence he shall be informed in ordinary language of— 
 (a) whether or not he is compelled to give evidence (and if so in what circumstances), and 
 (b) the uses to which his evidence (or the fact of his failure to give evidence) may be put by the court in a country outside the United Kingdom before which the proceedings are carried on.'.—[Mr. Hawkins.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 New clause 3—Application of sections 30 and 31 (No. 2)— 
'.—(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 30 and 31. 
 (2) For the avoidance of doubt, proceedings before a nominated court are not to be treated as proceedings before a court of any country other than the United Kingdom, and nothing in sections 30 and 31 confers any jurisdiction on a court of any country other than the United Kingdom in respect of anything done in the United Kingdom.'.

Nick Hawkins: It would be helpful to have new clause 2 as a safeguard in respect of clauses 31 and 32. The information—what I might call the warnings—to the witnesses should be written in ordinary language. I shall not detain the Committee by stressing in great detail the support on the Opposition Benches for the use of plain English, but as the Minister knows from previous debates I have always been a strong supporter of the plain English campaign. I say that despite being a lawyer. I am one of those lawyers who used to support the plain English campaign even when I practised.
 New clause 3 is a sensible provision for the avoidance of doubt. It would ensure that we do not get into danger of surrendering our sovereignty. Some of the relevant issues were debated in another place on 23 January in columns GC 104 to 105. There is no point repeating what my noble Friends Baroness Anelay of St. Johns and Lord Renton of Mount Harry said. I am sure that the Minister has read that, too. I beg to move new clauses 2.

Bob Ainsworth: We believe that proper safeguards for witnesses are already provided in clauses 30 and 31, combined with schedule 2. The two sorts of hearing are subject to different rules. Television evidence is governed by clause 30, which says that witness can be compelled to attend the court. Telephone evidence is governed by clause 31, which says they cannot be
 compelled. Schedule 2 makes it clear that there is a significant difference between these hearings.
 Paragraph (1) of part 1 of schedule 2, entitled ''Securing attendance of witnesses'', relates to the television link and states that the nominated court has powers for securing the attendance of a witness, as it does for proceedings before the court. By contrast, paragraph (11) of part 2, entitled ''Notification of witness'', relates to the telephone link and only gives the court the power to inform the witness of when the hearing will take place. That paragraph states that the court must be satisfied that the witness is willingly giving evidence by telephone. 
 The usual domestic summons procedures will apply in relation to television hearings. The summons will be issued by the domestic court in accordance with our law under section 97 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. Summonses set out when and where the witness should appear, the consequences of failure to comply and details of who to contact for more information. We consider that the existing summons procedures are appropriate. 
 Schedule 2 sets out the circumstances in which a witness cannot be compelled to give evidence by television link. A witness could not be compelled to give any evidence if he could not be compelled to give it in criminal proceedings in the UK, were he participating in domestic proceedings, if giving any evidence would be prejudicial to the security of the UK, or in his capacity as an officer or servant of the Crown. The first point ensures that the witness is granted at least the same protections as in domestic proceedings, even though the hearing is being conducted by an overseas court. 
 The requirement in the second part of new clause 2 is not appropriate. It is extremely unlikely that our authorities would be able to provide witnesses with information about the uses for which their evidence may be put. The overseas authority conducting the hearing would inform the witness of as much as necessary on the use of evidence under its law. 
 Turning to new clause 3, other than for the purposes of contempt of court and perjury, television and telephone hearings are not proceedings before a UK court. The Bill enables witnesses to be heard as part of the proceedings before an overseas court, and they take place under the law of the state that requested the hearing. The witness would give evidence as part of foreign proceedings and the foreign court would not be conducting proceedings in the UK. The mutual legal assistance convention and the Bill are designed to ensure that witnesses are adequately protected under the law of the country in which they are present, even though the evidence they are giving is taken in accordance with the law of a country outside the UK. The provisions ensure that while a domestic court is not conducting the hearing, it has the appropriate powers to safeguard the rights of the witness. 
 The protections are adequate. They cover the position where the court has the ability to take sanctions against witnesses who commit perjury or contempt as defined in our law, while they are present 
 in our domestic court. I am unable to accept the hon. Gentleman's new clauses.

Nick Hawkins: As I expected, the Minister has given a similar response to that which was given in another place by his noble Friend Lord Bassam of Brighton. The Minister has slightly expanded on what was said at column GC105. However, my noble Friend Baroness Anelay of St. Johns said, on 23 January:
''My difficulty still remains. We shall be enforcing a system whereby someone could be accused of an offence of contempt which was not committed in this country.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 23 January 2003; Vol. 643, c. GC105.]
 We are still not entirely satisfied on this issue, but nothing will be served by taking the matter forward any further today. My hon. Friend the Member for South-East Cambridgeshire and I will confer with our noble Friends in another place, because they might want to return to this matter. 
 However, for the moment, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. 
 Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Heppell.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at fourteen minutes to Five o'clock till Tuesday 17 June at ten minutes past Nine o'clock.